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THE IRRIGABLE ACRES DOCTRINE
The irrigable acres doctrine enunciated in Arizona v. California1
holds that the quantity of an Indian tribe's reserved water is
measured by the reservation's practicably irrigable acres. However,
that decision left some doubt whether the Court intended the doc-
trine to be a measure for all Indian reserved rights or whether the
doctrine is limited to the facts of Arizona v. California where five
Indian tribes lived on irrigable but very arid lands. This comment
intends to discuss the irrigable acres doctrine, its applicability to
various situations, and alternative standards for determining reserved
rights in water. Should all tribes receive an irrigable acres quantity
regardless of its appropriateness? Should the determination of the
quantity of the implied reservation of water be based on each tribe's
peculiar situation? Should they receive, at the very least, all the
waters arising on the reservation? Should the measure be experience
of past use or some estimate of future needs? If the reserved right
does not encompass future, nonagricultural development on the res-
ervation, does the Government's fiduciary duty to the Indians in-
clude the duty to purchase additional water rights for them? None of
these questions were answered in Arizona v. California, so the lower
courts will have to fashion solutions for them as they arise.
ORIGIN
A. The Winters Doctrine
The irrigable acres doctrine is the latest elaboration of the "Win-
ters doctrine" originally declared in the landmark case of Winters v.
United States. 2 By holding that the purpose of the reservation was to
convert the Indians from a nomadic to a pastoral way of life, the
Court in Winters inferred from the treaty a reservation of the water
necessary for the new way of life. Statements in the Winters case
have given rise to two water reservation theories: (1) that of reserva-
tion by the Indians and (2) that of reservation by the Federal Gov-
ernment. Justice McKenna spoke both of what the Indians "gave,"
knowingly or unknowingly, and of the Federal Government's recog-
1. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1962).
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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nized right to reserve waters and exempt them from state appropria-
tion.
The first theory, that of reservation by the Indians, is that the
Indians retained all they did not expressly grant away of their once
vast aboriginal lands.4 Those espousing this theory rely on the rule of
construction that Indian treaties and other dealings with Indians are
to be given a liberal construction in the Indians' favor: "as that
unlettered people would have understood it,"' avoiding the tradi-
tional constructions of such writings. The Indian treaties did not
mention the water rights and so it was implied the water was reserved
by the Indians.
The second theory, that of reservation by the Federal Govern-
ment, is found in Arizona v. California and several other cases. Those
cases 6 extended the power of the Government to reserve waters for
non-Indian federal reservations such as national forests. Paul Bloom
has explained the Winters result as the Court's desire to avoid a
genocidal construction of a treaty. He perceives a contractual or
quasi-contractual interpretation of the 1888 treaty establishing the
Fort Belknap reservation, citing other authors who refer to the lack
of "consideration" and the "unconscionability" of any other result.7
Those who support this second theory apparently do not materially
distinguish the situation of an Indian reservation from that of other
federal reservations.8
3. Id. at 576, 577.
4. The following cases support reservation by the Indians: United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), 330
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938); Skeem v.
United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921).
5. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832); Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946); Skeem v. United States,
273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.Supp.
252 (D.D.C. 1973); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928); Mason v. Sams, 5
F.2d 255 (W.D. Wash. 1925); Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 86 Ore. 617, 169 P. 121 (1917).
6. Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (Pelton Dam case); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); United States v. Mclntire, 101
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
7. Bloom, Indian "Paramount" Rights to Water Use, 16 Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Institute
669 (1971), citing Bradshaw, Water in the Woods: The Reserved-Rights Doctrine and the
National Forest Lands, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1187, 1188 (1968); Hillhouse, The Federal Re-
served Water Doctrine-Application to the Problem of Water for Oil Shale Development, 3
Land & Water L. Rev. 75, 81 (1968); Miller, Indians, Water and the Arid Western States-a
Prelude to the Pelton Decision, 5 Utah L. Rev. 495, 501 (1957).
8. William Veeder, a proponent of the first theory, would make such a distinction,
however. He notes the Indians' tribal sovereignty and emphasizes the language in Winters
that the Indians "gave" their lands rather than the language on the power of the Federal
Government to reserve lands and water. Veeder distinguishes Winters rights from those in
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B. Applications of the Winters Doctrine
In the Winters family of cases,9 the various courts have held the
circumstances and purposes of a reservation determine whether an
implied reservation of water exists. In Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne,' 0 for
example, the land was not arid and did not need irrigation; conse-
quently, the court found no implied reservation of water. In United
States v. Wightman, '1 it was held that the waters were not reserved
even though the land was arid, for only a few acres on the reservation
could be irrigated by the springs in controversy and these springs
were vital to the use of the adjoining military reservation which had
recently been opened to settlement.
C. The Winters Doctrine and Prior Appropriation
Some courts have used the prior appropriation doctrine to infer a
reservation of water. For example, in Arizona v. California, the Court
found the priority dates to be the dates of the establishment of the
reservations, and so the Indians' water rights were "present perfected
rights" and had priority over the Boulder Canyon Project.' 2 The
Court in Wightman distinguished Winters by finding that in Winters
the Indians had previously used some water from the Milk River for
irrigation.' In Wightman, however, only the military personnel had
used Goodwin Springs; thus, the Indians themselves had made no
prior appropriations of the water."
Other courts have held that any prior appropriation is irrelevant,
that even the use or occupancy of the reservation is not necessary to
preserve the Indian water right.' ' In United States v. McIntire' 6 and
Arizona v. California, labeling Winters rights "immemorial" and those of Arizona v. Cali-
fornia "investive." He believes that even though Arizona v. California purports to follow
Winters, it is actually following Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 442
(1955) (the "Pelton case") which relied on the property clause of the Constitution in
construing the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
See Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 Rocky Mt. Mineral
L. Institute 631 (1971).
9. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905); United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956),
330 F.2d 897 (9th Cit. 1964); Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946);
United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Conrad Investment
Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cit. 1908); United States v. Conrad Inv. Co., 156 F.
123 (D. Mont. 1907).
10. 86 Ore. 617, 169 P. 121 (1917).
11. 230 F. 277 (D. Ariz. 1916).
12. 373 U.S. at 600.
13. 230 F. at 282, citing 207 U.S. 564.
14. Id. at 279.
15. United States v. Mclntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Walker
River Irr. Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939); Mclntire v. United States, 22 F.Supp. 316 (D.
Mont. 1937); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928).
16. 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
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in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon,' '" the courts held that only
"public lands," a category which does not include Indian reserva-
tions, are subject to private appropriations under state prior appro-
priation law.
THE NEED FOR QUANTIFICATION OF INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS
Although the exact origin of the Indians' implied reservation of
water and all the elements of the Winters doctrine are not clear,
assuming that there is an implied reservation, the quantity of water
reserved to the Indians must be decided. For without some resolu-
tion, sometime in the future Indian tribes may claim a right in water
being used by non-Indians. In such a situation, the Indians, at least,
could demand compensation for the loss of their water. However, the
people who are subject to the potential claims are entitled to some
notice the claims exist.' B
To these various problems, John C. Guadnola has suggested a solu-
tion which is based on the Colorado water system which permits a
present adjudication of future rights and provides notice to those
involved. That system utilizes conditional decrees; the final degree is
for the amount actually put to beneficial use. However, when a water
appropriation is for municipal uses, the final decree is for the full
amount authorized by the conditional degree. The municipality may
sell or lease the excess until its needs match the amount of the
decree. Guadnola would put federal reservations in the municipal
category.' 9 This solution would still present a problem for those
who have been buying or leasing the reserved water. Even though
they would have received notice, they would be in difficulty when
the water is taken for the owner's own use.
Veeder would answer that western water law is harsh: "first in
time is first in right." 2 0 Those with senior rights are protected
against those whose rights are junior in areas of short supply. He
notes, however, that in theory Indian reserved rights are not subject
to the beneficial use and other requirements of the prior appropria-
tion system. The Indians would not lose their rights by non-use or
even by failure to occupy the land to which the right is appurte-
nant. 
2
On the other hand, Robert Dellwo has pointed out that the use-it-
17. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
18. Bloom, supra note 7.
19. Guadnola, Adjudication of Federal Reserved Water Rights, 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 161
(1970).
20. Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights, 26 Mont. L. Rev. 149 (1965).
21. Id.
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or-lose-it principle has been applied to Indian rights, irrespective of
the theoretical privileges of Winters rights.2 2 Even when a court is
acting favorably to Indians, they often receive a quantum less than
even the amount needed at the time. For instance, in United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation District,2 3 an agreement apparently intended to
be only a temporary working agreement during the pending adjudica-
tion was held binding, limiting the Indians to considerably less than
the full amount of the stream to which the court admitted they
otherwise would have been entitled.
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS
Aside from the difficulty in presently adjudicating a future right,
it is not clear which government is to administer Indian reserved
rights. Although the McCarran Amendment,2 4 which permits state
adjudications of federal water rights, has been held to apply to fed-
eral reservations, 2 5 the cases which so held were not deciding the
Amendment's applicability to Indian reservations. It has been held
that federal laws do not apply to Indians unless they expressly state
that they do,2 6 and if some doubt exists, the applicability cannot be
said to be express.
STANDARDS FOR THE QUANTIFICATION
OF INDIAN RESERVED RIGHTS
Once the questions of origin, method of notice, and administra-
tion of reserved rights are resolved and adjudication has begun, the
question of what standard is to be used to measure the quantity of
the Indians' reserved rights arises. Court decisions of the past, as well
as the more recent Arizona v. California decision, have used various
criteria.
A. "Reasonably Necessary" Standard
In United States v. Conrad Investment Co.2 7 involving a fact situa-
tion similar to that of Winters, the court found that, although a
stream on public lands bordering an Indian reservation did not lose
22. Dellwo, Indian Water Rights-the Winters Doctrine Updated, 6 Gonzaga L. Rev. 215
(1971).
23. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956).
24. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
25. United States v. District Court for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971); United
States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
26. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
27. 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
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its public character, the Indians were entitled to the water "reason-
ably necessary for the purposes of irrigation and stock raising,
domestic and other useful purposes."2 8 The quantity was to apply
to future, as well as present, needs. The defendant was permitted to
use only the surplus water, and the decree was to be modified when
the Indians' needs changed. United States v. Powers2 9 also held the
implied reservation was for both irrigation and other purposes.
B. "Past Experience" Standard
Winters itself gives no measure of the water reserved. Apparently
the whole river could have been held reserved had the Indians needed
it. United States v. Walker River Irrigation District3 0 held that irri-
gable acres was not necessarily the criterion to be used in measuring
the reserved right. Instead, the court based its decision on "experi-
ence." Relying on the master's report comparing past and present
population and acres under cultivation, the court decided the Indians
would not need to irrigate any additional acres. Apparently, the only
use of the reservation land contemplated was some form of subsis-
tence farming by the Indians themselves.
C "Variable Needs" Standard
In contrast, United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District3 1 held
the Indians' right to water was not limited to their use at any given
time but extended to their ultimate needs as those needs and require-
ments should grow with the development of Indian agriculture on
the reservation. The court did not seem to follow Walker but cited
that opinion with approval, mentioning its use of seventy years of
experience to estimate the future needs.
D. "Highest and Best Use" Standard
Ronald Young has emphasized the Government's fiduciary duty to
the Indians. According to him, the purpose of the reservations was
not merely to transform the Indians into an agricultural people but
to better their lives while integrating them into the mainstream of
American life. 2 Using this theory, if agriculture was not appropriate
or if a better use could be made of the reservation, agriculture should
28. Id. at 831 (emphasis added).
29. 94 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1938).
30. 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).
31. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956).
32. Young, Interagency Conflicts of Interest: the Peril to Indian Water Rights, 1972 Law
& Social Order 313 (1972); see also Warner, Federal Reserved Water Rights and their
Relationship to Appropriative Rights in the Western States, 15 Rocky Mt. Mineral L. Insti-
tute 399 (1969).
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not be considered the purpose for which the reservation was estab-
lished, and the amount of water impliedly reserved was not simply
the amount needed for irrigation. Consequently, an irrigable acres
measure would not always result in a feasible or fair quantity of
water. However, such an analysis is open to the criticism that a
government that restricted the Indians to limited and often inferior
land would hardly have intended to give those Indians the best water
or an unlimited amount of water. Also, while a request by the gov-
ernment attorneys for an application of the irrigable acres doctrine
to a reservation unsuited for agriculture might be found to be a
breach of the Government's fiduciary duty to the Indians, it is not
clear that the court's application of the existing doctrine, without
such a request by government attorneys, would be a breach.
E. "All Water on the Reservation" Standard
The court in United States v. Alexander' 3 went so far as to say
that "[t] he treaty impliedly reserved all waters on the reservation to
the Indians." 34 This statement suggests the possibility that all waters
arising on the reservation belong to the Indians and the quantity is
not limited to any particular use to which the waters might have
originally been intended. Such a finding is consistent with the theory
that the Indians reserved the waters. To suggest that the Indians are
not entitled to all the waters arising on the reservation because all the
water is not needed for an agricultural use of the reservation is analo-
gous to arguing that if the purpose of the reservation is agriculture,
the Indians are entitled to only the quantity of timber, minerals, and
other resources needed for agriculture and domestic consumption.
However, ownership of timber and minerals on the reservations has
already been determined to be in the Indian tribes.3 5
F. "Irrigable Acres" Standard
In Arizona v. California, the Court affirmed the master's finding
that the water was intended to satisfy future as well as present needs
of the Indian reservations and that enough water was reserved to
irrigate all the practicably irrigable acres on the reservations. The
Court agreed with the master that irrigable acres was "the only feasi-
33. 131 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942).
34. 131 F.2d at 360. The treaty referred to was signed on October 17, 1855 (11 Stat.
657).
35. See United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 115-116 (1938);
United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 122-123 (1938),
where the Court held that although the fee of the minerals and timber was in the United
States, the Government could not appropriate these items for its own use without paying
the Indians just compensation.
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ble and fair way," and that "reasonably forseeable needs," the stan-
dard advocated by the State of Arizona, was only a guess.36
Since the Arizona v. California decision, the irrigable acres doc-
trine would appear to be the chosen standard and the Supreme
Court's last word on measurement of reserved rights. It is certainly
more objective than guesses. Many would insist the irrigable acres
standard was intended as, or at least should be used as, the standard
for measuring all reserved rights. Others would claim the standard is
limited to the facts of the Arizona v. California situation and that a
contrary result would be a breach of the Government's fiduciary
duty to the Indians.' "
CRITICISM
The use of the irrigable acres standard in Arizona v. California was
actually quite generous to the Indians. By the use of this standard, a
small reservation population received a large quantity of water, larger
than that which they would have received under a Walker River
measure of "experience," and the use was not limited to irrigation.
However, the irrigable acres standard will not produce this favorable
result if a tribe has no irrigable acres. Veeder would limit the irrigable
acres doctrine to the facts of Arizona v. California.3 8 He notes that
Winters rights have been used for purposes other than agriculture,
particularly for fishing and recreation.
Many Indian tribes which may be well situated for a recreation
industry, tribes located in mountainous regions may have little or no
irrigable acres on which to base a reserved water right. Yet, they
would have a need for water for fishing and other recreation projects
if they were to utilize the scenic attractions of the reservation which
may well be their primary resource. To these tribes, the irrigable
acres standard is neither feasible nor fair.3 9 This seems to be the
thrust of the statement by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Cali-
fornia that it is impossible to believe that when Congress and the
Executive established these reservations they were unaware of the
conditions there or of the fact that water would be essential to the
life of the Indian people.4 0
36. 373 U.S. at 600-01.
37. Bloom, supra note 7; Veeder, supra note 8.
38. Veeder, supra note 8.
39. These tribes suggest that an attempt is being made "to limit and restrict the Indian
people to their present meager uses of water without any further allowances for uses to
which they are rightfully entitled under the historic 'Winters Doctrine.' " Testimony of
Wendell Chino, President of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, in Hearings on Indian Water Rights
Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-53 (1974).
40. 373 U.S. at 598-99.
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CONCLUSION
Today, many Indian tribes are federally chartered corporations as
well as government entities with diverse business interests and invest-
ments. They have a need and a duty to provide employment for
tribal members, whether or not farming is practical on the reserva-
tion. In answer to this need, the tribes raise cattle, attract industry,
and build resorts just as municipalities do.
The variable needs standard would handle the growing needs of
the tribes; they claim, that they unlike municipalities, have a right to
water which has always been theirs and which, because of their
peculiar status, has not been lost through non-use. However, the
variable needs standard would make chaotic any attempt to admin-
ister water rights in any area that contained Indian lands. Even if
government compensation was provided to those who lost their
water to Indian claims, there would be no notice that such claims
existed or might arise.
Considering past and present treatment of Indians, particularly in
the area of land and resources, it is absurd to expect they would
receive water sufficient for the highest and best use of the reserva-
tion. Indians simply would never be given this amount; public policy
is against it.
Even if most Indian reservations were established primarily with
the idea of turning these nomadic peoples into farmers, this purpose
could not be accomplished unless the Indians were placed on lands
conducive to agriculture. Of course, in many situations the addition
of irrigation water permits otherwise arid lands to be farmed. In
those cases an irrigable acres standard might be appropriate. Even if
the Indians did not choose to farm, with a moderately large reserva-
tion they would receive a large quantity of water which they could
then use for other purposes. However, some reservations have few if
any irrigable acres; the irrigable acres standard might provide them
with only enough water for the most primitive subsistence. The Gov-
ernment could probably not succeed in a claim that it had fulfilled
its fiduciary duty by merely bringing the Indians into a 19th century
rural economy while the rest of the country is living in the 20th
century; in fact, the Government long ago abandoned the idea of
turning the Indians into a class of yeoman farmers. The irrigable
acres standard then is not appropriate for all reservations. The experi-
ence standard presents the same problem; it would provide only a
subsistence (or lower) level of water on many reservations.
A compromise solution should use all the standards as appropriate.
The Indians should be guaranteed a minimum quantity of water
April 19751]
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consisting of all the water arising on the reservation, if any, and a
quantity based on irrigable acres, if any. In awarding Indians water
the courts should look to the amount "reasonably necessary" for
utilization of the reservation resources, considering experience, irriga-
ble acres, and the other standards, but without being bound by any.
REBECCA E. WARDLAW
